No Direction Home: Will The Law Keep Pace With Human Tracking Technology to
Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?
William A. Herbert
Abstract
The scope and nature of current legal principles regarding individual privacy are
not sufficient to respond to the rapid development and use of human tracking technology.
The academic use of the phrase “geoslavery” to describe the abusive use of such
technology underscores the power of the new technology. This article examines the use
of such technology under current federal and state law and suggests potential means for
developing greater legal protections against the abusive use of the technology and the
intrusion into personal privacy.
The primary legal source for protections against governmental intrusion into an
individual’s privacy stem from various federal and state constitutional provisions
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts have determined that most
technologically based human location tracking outside the home is not subject to Fourth
Amendment restrictions because it does not violate an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. In contrast, some analogous state constitutional provisions have
been held to require a warrant prior to the police utilizing human tracking technology.
The growing proliferation and use of human tracking technology implicates legal
issues under the Thirteenth Amendment. Control and restriction of another individual’s
location constitutes one of the vestiges and incidents of slavery. The use of mandatory or
voluntary human tracking implants may be the subject to future federal legislative
prohibition or restrictions under the remedial provision of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Various federal and state laws have been proposed and enacted to place
restrictions on both governmental and private use of human tracking technology. In
addition, the use of such technology has been subject to challenge under a common law
right to privacy. Increasingly, public and private employers are utilizing human tracking
devices to monitor employee movement and conduct. Due to the propensity of American
labor law to give greater weight to employer property interests over most employee
privacy expectations, there are few current limitations on the use of human tracking in
employment.
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Introduction
The creation and increased use of various forms of human tracking technology by
governmental entities, private entities and individuals raise profound policy and legal
issues for our society. The scope of constitutional, legislative or administrative
limitations on the use of such technology reflects on our society’s concepts of freedom,
individual autonomy and protected privacy. As technology advances, it expands the
means for privacy intrusions thereby limiting the personal secrets and confidences that
can be concealed. The growing availability and use of human tracking technology
diminishes privacy interests that may precipitate societal demands for increased legal
protections.
How freedom and privacy are defined today has substantive consequences in the
legal measures that will be devised and applied to protect those interests. As Columbia
University historian Eric Foner has shown, the concept and boundaries of freedom have
changed over the course of American history. Throughout our history, the definition of
freedom has been constantly redefined but has always been subject to a balance between
individual rights and property rights, as well as, a balance between the right of the
individual and the power of the state.1 Similar balances are applicable in how the
contours of protected individual privacy are defined.
In order to respond to the power of contemporary human tracking, a new societal
consensus needs to be reached regarding what constitutes privacy and how it can be
protected. At the same time, a judgment must be reached whether the legal standards
applicable to government surveillance under the Constitution should be the same for nongovernmental surveillance.
In contemporary American culture, some view the concept of freedom as being
manifested in consumerism with the ubiquitous cell phone as a primary symbol. It is
1
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doubtful that most cell phone users are aware that the same technology that grants them
this sense of consumer freedom also results in wireless companies receiving automatic
and continuous updates regarding their location. Physical possession of a cell phone
renders an individual vulnerable to location surveillance by government entities. When an
employer distributes a cell phone for use by an employee, the employee’s location
becomes subject to location monitoring by the employer on and off the job. A third party
who obtains physical access to another person’s cell phone can easily transform it into a
stalking device by registering it with an internet location based services.2 Mass
recognition of this non-negotiated trade of a cellular sense of freedom for perpetual
surveillance may constitute an Achilles heel to the currently unregulated location based
tracking marketplace.
Unlike the debates connected with bioethics and stem cell research, the legal and
ethical issues connected with human tracking technology have not been subjected to a
serious and rigorous debate. Whether our society is prepared to collectively accept
narrow notions of privacy and autonomy through electronic location devices remains to a
large extent unexplored. Recent media disclosures of unchecked and probable unlawful
use of presidential authority to engage in warrantless technologically based surveillance
of Americans may spur a more reasoned and spirited societal discussion regarding the
impact of new technology on personal privacy.3 Such disclosures may render unuseful the
political cliché “9/11 changed everything” as justification for the erosion of protected
privacy interests and other civil liberties.4 It remains to be seen whether the discussion
regarding unchecked presidential power will extend to a broader questioning of electronic
surveillance.
This article will discuss various legal principles and issues associated with human
tracking technology in both the public and private sectors. In addition, it will aim to
suggest potential solutions aimed at creating a balance between liberty and security as
they relate to the utilization of human tracking devices. The application of such
principles and the nature of the solutions will depend on the type of tracking device and
the context in which the device is utilized. For example, the legal rules applicable to
mandatory or voluntary human implants containing location technology should be far
more restrictive than limitations that may be placed on an employer utilizing a location
device to track an employee driving an employer owned vehicle with a GPS installation
during working hours.
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Currently, the contours of protected privacy remain closely linked to property
rights. As will be seen, constitutional protections against technological invasions into
privacy remain strongest inside one’s home or apartment with the windows shuttered.
Once an individual leaves his or her home or is visible inside the home from public
space, there is a precipitous drop in the scope of legal protections.
In contrast, many of us still retain a subjective sense of spatial autonomy even
though within the eyeshot of the public eye. The concept that one can get lost in a crowd
and retain a protected zone of privacy and autonomy currently lacks strong legal
foundation. Historically, escape to urban areas constituted a means of obtaining
anonymity and a new identity.5 The growing availability of human tracking technology
has the probability of eviscerating any subjective sense of personal autonomy while
outside the home unless there is corrective legislative action.
This article will discuss various legal principles and issues associated with human
tracking technology in both the public and private sectors. In addition, it will aim to
suggest potential legal solutions aimed at creating a balanced approach between liberty
and security as they relate to human tracking technology. The application of such
principles and the nature of the solutions will depend on the type of tracking device and
the context in which the device is utilized. Concerns relating to privacy and autonomy are
greatest when global positioning system (hereinafter “GPS”)6, radio frequency
identification (hereinafter “RFID”)7 and cellular technology8 are utilized by the
government to conduct surveillance, employers to monitor employees, school districts to
5
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track their students, rental car companies to monitor the use of rented vehicles and
parents to keep track of their elusive teenagers.
Important legal and policy issues also arise in the context of individual volitional
use of tracking technology for safety and convenience. The utilization of new
technological gadgets can result in unwanted or unanticipated third party surveillance and
unforeseen negative consequences such as stalking. Although many motorists enjoy the
efficiency of electronic tollbooths and “smart highways” such enjoyment may abruptly
end if or when the government begins to issue speeding tickets premised on the electronic
information that calculates the average speed of a trip between two electronic points.9 The
federal government is currently funding state studies regarding the use of GPS tracking
on toll roads to develop “mileage-based user fees.”10 Similarly, market location devices
and services do not constitute “magic bullets” that resolve parental fears. Equipment
failure or malfunction in such devices and services can increase anxiety, if not panic, for
a parent who chooses tracking technology over direct supervision of a child.
The legal implications relating to an individual’s volitional use of a tracking
device to monitor his or her own whereabouts or for safety while driving, hiking or
boating will not be the subject of this article. Reasonable people can differ whether
individual use of such technological devices lead to personal serenity or are necessitated
by genuine risks to personal safety.11 There are few justifications for expansive regulation
of an individual’s choice to utilize new technological gadgets unless the technology
results in unwanted or unanticipated third party surveillance, leads to an increase in
reckless and anti-social behavior or is used to intrude on the privacy of others. Tracking
devices, like other technological developments, can lead to unforeseen negative social
consequences.12
I. Constitutional Limitations On The Use of Human Tracking Technology
The primary source for current American legal analysis of protected privacy
interests stems from the field of constitutionally mandated criminal procedure based on
judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 At
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present, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to most recent forms of human tracking technology. Based on precedent
over the past four decades regarding the scope of privacy protections under the Fourth
Amendment, any expectation for broad judicially based limitations on human tracking
technology would be illusory.
The tendency of certain justices and judges to apply judicial restraint with respect
to constitutional criminal procedure should not be confused with indifference to the
impact technology is having on privacy. Five years ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, expressed deep concerns regarding the decline in privacy
in the modern technological world:
Technology now permits millions of important and confidential conversations to
occur through a vast system of electronic networks. These advances, however,
raise significant privacy concerns. We are placed in the uncomfortable position of
not knowing who might have access to our personal and business e-mails, our
medical and financial records, or our cordless and cellular telephone
conversations.14
Despite such pronouncements, it is unlikely that workable limitations on the use
of human tracking devices will grow out of criminal appeals under the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, it is unlikely that in present political climate Congress will
increase federal restrictions on tracking technology based on contemporary deregulation
ideology and the politics of fear. It is far more probable that broader restrictions will
come from state legislative initiatives and judicial interpretations of state constitutional
provisions, statutes and common law.
A.

Human Tracking and the Fourth Amendment

In 1928, fifty years following the invention of the telephone by Alexander
Graham Bell, in Olmstead v. United States15, the United States Supreme Court
determined that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit federal Prohibition officials from
eavesdropping on telephone conversations taking place in the defendants’ homes and
offices by inserting small wires on eight telephone lines outside those premises. The
Olmstead majority reasoned that because the federal agents had placed the wiretaps on
the outside they had not engaged in a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment
requiring the issuance of a warrant: “The intervening wires are not part of his house or
office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”16 Therefore, the

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
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majority affirmed the conspiracy convictions under National Prohibition Act that were
based on the eavesdropping evidence.
Today, the case of Olmstead v. United States is primarily remembered for the
vigorous dissent authored by Justice Louis D. Brandeis. Well before Olmstead, Brandeis
was known for his co-authorship of the seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article “The
Right to Privacy” that advocated for enforceable common law rights against the invasion
of personal privacy especially in the face of the development of new technologies such as
photography.17
In his Olmstead dissent, Brandeis presented a far-sighted critique regarding the
government’s use of the new technology to invade the privacy of its citizens. In contrast
to the majority’s reliance on concepts of trespass law to limit the zone of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment, Brandeis articulated a broader concept of
constitutionally protected privacy that transcends both property interests and materialism:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.18
Close to forty years later, the United States Supreme Court overruled the holding
in Olmstead v. United States. In Katz v. United States19, the Court held that the FBI’s
placement of a microphone on the roof of an enclosed public telephone booth to
eavesdrop and tape record telephone calls made by an illegal gambling suspect, without a
warrant, constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment regardless of whether or not a
physical intrusion had taken place. In reaching its decision in Katz v. United States, the
Court’s majority rejected both a strict reliance on trespass law to define the scope of
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment as well as Brandeis’ much broader
concept that the Fourth Amendment gave Americans “the right to be let alone” by other
people. Nevertheless, by mandating for the first time that the police obtain a courtordered warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance, the Katz decision established
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a significant judicial check on government agents randomly engaging in such
surveillance.20
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan formulated the now uniform test for
determining whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to a particular set of facts
including whether a particular use of a new invasive technology is unconstitutional: a)
whether the individual possesses a subjective expectation of privacy; and b) whether the
individual’s subjective expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable’.”21 Despite continued judicial reliance on Justice Harlan’s Katz formulation
regarding the applicable test for what constitutes a protected expectation of privacy, as
early as 1971 Justice Harlan distanced himself from the formulation noting that it can
“lead to the substitution of words for analysis” and emphasized that the critical question
“is whether under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at least the
protection of a warrant requirement.”22
B. The Fourth Amendment Outside and Inside the Home
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a series of federal court
decisions that have determined that, in most cases, the use of a tracking device to monitor
the location of vehicles and containers are not subject to the Fourth Amendment. The
primary exception to this rule is when the device is utilized to determine what is taking
place within a person’s home.
In 1983, in United States v. Knotts,23 the Supreme Court decided that the police
did not have to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment before using a radio beeper
to monitor the movement and location of a vehicle. The Court portrayed the use of such
tracking technology as a mere extension of the police’s power to engage in visual
surveillance of a criminal suspect.
In Knotts, the police had placed a battery operated radio transmitter in a drum
containing chloroform as part of a drug investigation. After the drug suspect purchased
the drum, the police used the beeper’s signals to assist in conducting surveillance of the
movement and location of the suspect’s car containing the drum of chloroform. The
beeper transmissions, along with additional visual surveillance by the police, resulted in
the issuance of a warrant and the disclosure of a clandestine drug laboratory located in a
rural Wisconsin cabin. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court applied a broad legal
rule that renders the use of most human tracking devices attached to vehicles to be
outside of Fourth Amendment protections: “A person traveling in an automobile on

20

389 U.S. at 350-353; See also, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1967).
389 U.S. at 361.
22
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
23
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
21

8

public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another.”24
Under Knotts, whether the vehicle is driven unseen on an empty highway, through
a long dark tunnel or an unpaved obscure mountainous road is irrelevant. The mere
exposure of the vehicle to the sunlight or the exterior darkness grants the police, without
a warrant, to monitor the movement of the vehicle utilizing a tracking device lawfully
placed.
The principle applied in Knotts was based on earlier cases that decided Americans
have no reasonable expectation of privacy while outside the home because others may be
able to observe them. This voluntary exposure exception to Fourth Amendment
protections has been long recognized by the Supreme Court. Under the exception, it does
not matter whether the exposure is intentional or inadvertent because the act of exposure
defeats any claimed expectation of privacy.
It is reasonable to assume that this limited conception of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment would be equally applicable to the use of location devices that are legally
attached or carried by an individual on public streets, roads and trails. An expansive
application of this principle to new location technology in an unregulated market
economy would permit anyone to electronically track anyone else in public.
One year after Knotts, the Supreme Court in United States v. Karo,25 was called
upon to determine whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when the police during
another drug investigation used a beeper in a can of chemicals to determine the can’s
location within a private residence not open to visual surveillance. Like Knotts, the police
in Karo had used beeper transmissions and visual surveillance to follow the movement of
the can to various locations. However, unlike Knotts, the police continued to utilize the
beeper to determine whether the can was located in the private house. In concluding that
the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Karo majority applied a core Fourth
Amendment principle that a search and seizure inside a home without a warrant is
presumptively unreasonable absent an exigent circumstance. Based on the fact that the
beeper allowed the police to learn that the can was located in the house and allowed for
them to monitor its internal movement, the Court concluded that the use of the tracking
device constituted an unlawful search under Fourth Amendment.
The broad scope of judicially recognized Fourth Amendment protections against
technological surveillance within the home was exemplified in the 2001 decision in Kyllo
v. United States.26 At the same time, the Kyllo decision suggests that the proliferation of
invasive technological tools in general public use may eviscerate any reasonable
expectation to privacy within one’s home.
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In Kyllo, the police suspected that marijuana was being grown inside a home
utilizing high-density halide lamps. In order to determine whether such lamps were being
utilized, the police while seated in their car in the street, scanned the home utilizing a
thermal imager to detect infrared radiation that is invisible to the naked eye. The scanning
device reported that portions of the house were hotter than other sections of the house and
neighboring homes. In concluding that the police’s use of the thermal-imaging device
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because it was capable of detecting
lawful behavior in the house, the Kyllo majority stated:
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use,
to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”27
At present, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the Fourth Amendment with
regard to more advanced forms of tracking technology such as GPS, RFID or real time
cell site monitoring. Based on Supreme Court precedent since Katz, it is unlikely that the
Court will rule that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant prior to the police utilizing
such devices to electronically track movement in public. However, a strong argument can
be made that based on the scope of private information obtainable through GPS and
cellular tracking technology the Fourth Amendment probable cause and warrant
requirements should be found applicable.28 In 2005, a federal District Court in New York,
relying on the Knotts decision, ruled that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when
the police attached GPS devices to the defendant’s vehicles because the defendant had no
expectation of privacy while driving on public roadways. In contrast, a federal judge in
Maryland has questioned, without deciding, whether the extraordinary amount of detailed
personal information obtainable through the use of a GPS device would render it subject
to Fourth Amendment constraints.29
The Kyllo and Karo decisions strongly suggest that the use of GPS, RFID and real
time cell site technology by the police to monitor the location of an individual or object
within a home will be subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Based on
the portability of cell phones, lawful public location surveillance by the police under
Knotts can easily be transformed into unlawful surveillance under Karo by the cell phone
being carried into a home or other private space. Last year, three United States District
Court Magistrates issued decisions raising such Fourth Amendment concerns with respect
to warrantless real time cell site monitoring.30
27
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Finally, it should not be overlooked that the Kyllo decision contains an ominous
caveat regarding Fourth Amendment protections against electronic surveillance within a
home: it is limited to devices that are not “in general public use.”31 This expressed
limitation in the Kyllo holding raises the possibility that the proliferation of cell phones
and inexpensive GPS devices could lead the Supreme Court to conclude that electronic
monitoring within a home using such devices is not subject to the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment and Human Tracking
Professors Jerome Dobson and Peter F. Fisher have applied the term “geoslavery”
to describe how new location tracking devices can result in coercive control over human
movement and direction.32 The metaphorical application of the term slavery to electronic
human tracking has both historical precedence and legal relevance.33 From well before
the Civil War through the 1930’s, phrases such as “wage slavery” and “industrial
slavery” were frequently applied to describe the oppressed conditions and status of
workers.34 The brutal reality of chattel slavery was obviously and substantially more
oppressive than 19th Century working conditions or contemporary use of electronic
monitoring. Nevertheless, in considering possible legal restraints applicable to human
tracking it is relevant to consider the value such devices would have had for slaveholders
in the 19th Century, the impact such technology would have had on American history and
whether such devices constitute a vestige of slavery.
Historians John Hope Franklin and Loren Schweninger have detailed and
documented the amount of time and resources Southern slaveholders had to expend in
searching for and capturing runaway slaves.35 Their study highlights that essential aspects
of American slavery included restrictions on the freedom of movement of enslaved
African-Americans and severe corporal punishment imposed by slaveholders and
overseers when slaves were caught escaping or captured following escape.
Many in bondage attempted and succeeded in escaping for different motives
including legal emancipation, reunions with family members and escape from
particularly brutal owners. The method and direction of escape differed widely causing
slave owners to rely on speculation and surmise in seeking to track down their escaped
human property.36 As a means of locating and capturing those who escaped, slaveholders
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hired lawyers, petitioned state legislatures, purchased newspapers advertisements and
utilized slave catchers. These means of human tracking were expensive and inefficient.
American concerns regarding the location and capture of those who escaped from
bondage can be found in the United States Constitution. Slaveholder interest in
maintaining physical and legal control over their human chattel was so great that the
Constitution was drafted to contain the Fugitive Slave Clause aimed at guaranteeing the
return of a runaway who succeeded in an interstate escape.37 The Fugitive Slave Clause,
originally proposed by a South Carolina delegate to the Constitutional Convention, was
aimed at insuring that slaveholders had a constitutionally based means of obtaining the
return of a runaway slave who had escaped to a free state without the drafters’ using the
word slavery.38 In 1793, the Second Congress enacted legislation granting slaveholders
and their agents a specific legal procedure permitting them to seize an individual and take
him or her before a magistrate to obtain a certificate requiring a return to bondage in a
slave state.39
As part of the Compromise of 1850, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act
aimed at easing the ability of Southern slaveholders to recapture fugitive slaves through
federal judicial means. However, rather than calming the rising national dispute over
slavery, the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act precipitated an increase in aggressive
Abolitionist activity including active resistance to the capture of freed slaves.40
The 1851 Thomas Sims’s Case41 is an example of the type of antebellum litigation
that resulted when slave owners sought the return of a runaway. On April 3, 1851, under
the powers of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, Commissioner George T. Curtis of the
United States Circuit Court issued a warrant to the Massachusetts federal marshal
requiring the capture of Sims, an African-American “fugitive from labor” to answer a
complaint filed on behalf of a Georgia slave owner.42 Following Sims’s capture and
imprisonment pursuant to the warrant, a habeas corpus petition was filed in
Massachusetts’s state court seeking to free Sims and challenging the Fugitive Slave Law.
The petition was heard before Massachusetts’ Chief Judge Lemuel Shaw, the father-inlaw of Herman Melville. To avoid the recurrence of Abolitionists’ physical efforts to
rescue Sims, heavy chains were placed around the courthouse.43 Although personally
opposed to slavery, Chief Judge Shaw denied the writ concluding that the Fugitive Slave
Act was constitutional based on the history of the Fugitive Slave Clause and precedent
37
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upholding the earlier 1793 federal fugitive slave law.44 Following Chief Judge Shaw’s
application of judicial restraint, Sims was returned to bondage in Georgia and subjected
to a severe public beating.45
The use of GPS and RFID technology by slave owners would have perpetuated
the enslavement of African-Americans, substantially decreased the cost of tracking down
runaways and altered American history. The use of real time location technology would
have vastly improved the monitoring of the daily productivity of slave labor thereby
increasing efficiency along with the economic value and power of America’s peculiar
institution. Such technology would have also made slave resistance and escape far more
difficult. Through GPS or RFID implants, slaveholders would have been able to easily
locate and identify individuals who succeeded in escaping. Working together,
slaveholders would have been able to establish geo-fences and a communications
network that would have substantially aided in slaveholder domination over the personal
lives of those held in bondage. By undermining the ability of individuals such as
Frederick Douglas from escaping, these technological tools may have decreased the
awareness in the North of the horrors of American slavery prior to the Civil War.46
In 1865, Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment, subsequently ratified by
the States, banning slavery and involuntary servitude. Unlike other constitutional
amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment uniquely restricts both private conduct as well
as governmental action.47 The Thirteenth Amendment states:
“1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
The Thirteenth Amendment was never intended to be limited to ending the
enslavement of African-Americans. In 1911, the United States Supreme Court
highlighted the amendment’s broad breath when it described the amendment as “a charter
of universal civil freedom of all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag”
that was intended to abolish both slavery as well all vestiges, badges and incidents of
slavery.48 In addition to outlawing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment also prohibits
involuntary servitude.
The amendment granted Congress the power to enact legislation targeted at
eliminating those badges and incidents of slavery including the “privilege to go and
come” as one pleases.49 Congressional authority under the amendment includes the power
44
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“to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to
translate that determination into effective legislation.” 50 However, it was not intended to
be the basis for challenging various established societal power relationships such as
parent-child.51
Based on the history and interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, Alexander
Tsesis has argued that the amendment provides the constitutional predicate for the
enactment of broad federal laws banning public and private limitations on universal
liberties.52
Whether a majority of the United States Supreme Court would concur with
Tsesis’ thesis of such broad congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment
remains in doubt. Various Supreme Court decisions in the past fifteen years have
demarcated newly established limitations on congressional legislative power under the
Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment and the remedial provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.53
Nevertheless, a reasonably strong argument can be made that Congress does have
the constitutional power under the remedial provision of the Thirteenth Amendment to
ban the use of tracking devices to dominate and control the location of others. Imposing
restrictions, control and monitoring over another’s location constitutes a vestige and
incident of slavery.
In addition, mandatory tracking or identification implants or attachments on
another human being would be subject to court challenge under the Thirteenth
Amendment. Such devices are the technological equivalent, in many respects, to various
slaveholder tools, including branding, utilized to keep African-Americans from escaping
from bondage or as punishment for such escapes. As such, the use of such devices to
establish geo-fences and even impose corporal punishment would constitute a vestige of
slavery. In addition, the imposition of physical injury or threat of physical injury
emanating from a tracking device would be subject to challenge as a form of involuntary
servitude especially if the electronic punishment is aimed at forcing an individual to
continue working.54
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D. State Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Tracking Devices
The application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test to new technological
intrusions is not without its critics. As Jeffrey Rosen has pointed out “as advances in the
technology of monitoring and searching have made ever more intrusive surveillance
possible, expectations of privacy have naturally diminished, with a corresponding
reduction in constitutional protections.”55 The Oregon Supreme Court in State v.
Campbell termed the reasonable expectation test “a formula for expressing a conclusion
rather than a starting point for analysis, masking the various substantive considerations
that are the real bases in which Fourth Amendment searches are defined.”56
Various state courts have determined, under their respective state constitutions,
that the police are required to obtain a warrant prior to utilizing an electronic device. In
reaching such legal conclusions, the courts have recognized that electronic tracking
devices are not mere technological enhancements to law enforcement vision but rather a
substantial intrusion into an individual’s privacy and autonomy.
In State v. Campbell, the Oregon Constitution was interpreted to prohibit the
police’s warrantless use of a radio transmitter to locate a private vehicle. In that case, the
police used a radio transmitter attached to a burglary suspect’s car to track his movements
after the police were unable to maintain constant visual surveillance. In determining that
a warrant is required prior to the police utilizing a tracking device, the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected the Supreme Court’s rationale in Knotts and determined that the
transmitter was a location finder rather than a mere extension of police visual tracking. In
substitution of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the Oregon Supreme Court
defined a privacy interest as “an interest in freedom from particular forms of scrutiny”
and concluded that the use of a radio transmitter to locate a person or object constituted a
significant limitation on the freedom from scrutiny.57
In reaching its conclusion, the Oregon court recognized the perniciousness of
technological tracking devices by creating a daily fear of being watched:
“The limitation is made more substantial by the fact that the radio transmitter
is more difficult to detect than would-be observers who must rely upon the sense
of sight. Without an ongoing, meticulous examination of one’s possessions,
one can never be sure that one’s location is not being monitored by means of a
radio transmitter. Thus, individuals must more readily assume that they are the
objects of government scrutiny.”58
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In 2003, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that under Washington’s more
protective constitutional provision regarding searches and seizures, the police were
required to obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to attaching a GPS device to a
citizen’s vehicle.59 In accord with the Oregon Supreme Court’s analysis, Washington’s
highest court concluded that a GPS device replaces rather than augments police visual
surveillance. In reaching its decision, Washington’s highest court recognized the
enormous intrusive power of GPS devices to provide a detailed picture of an individual’s
daily life:
“[u]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method of surveillance,
making it possible to acquire an enormous amount of personal information about
the citizen under circumstances where the individual is unaware that every single
vehicle trip taken and the duration of every single stop may be recorded by the
government.”60
Two New York State trial courts have rendered conflicting decisions regarding
whether the New York State Constitution requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to
attaching a GPS device to a vehicle. In People v. Lacey61, one county judge, without
articulating a developed legal analysis, concluded in 2004 that a warrant was required.
Last year, another county judge in People v. Gant62 reached the opposite conclusion
based on the Knotts analysis that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy while driving on public roads.
In addition to state constitutional limitations regarding governmental search and
seizure, certain states have explicit constitutional privacy provisions that may form the
basis for future challenges to governmental and private use of tracking devices. For
example, California Constitution, Art. 1, §1 contains an explicit reference to a right of
privacy applicable to both private as well as state conduct. 63 In 1970, Illinois in direct
response to the development of new intrusive technologies, amended its’ constitution to
include an expressed provision protecting its citizens against invasions of privacy
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including the use of electronic surveillance.64 Other states such as Hawaii, Alaska and
Florida have similar specific state constitutional provisions protecting the right to
privacy.65
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how these various state constitutional privacy
provisions will be applied to new electronic tracking devices. Unlike Oregon’s highest
court, the California Supreme Court in Hill v. NCAA, ruled that in order to be able to
allege a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff must establish
a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.66 To the extent that this standard is
applied, state constitutional privacy language may not form the basis for establishing
limits on the use of electronic surveillance to track public activities.
II. The Legal Implications of Human Tracking Implant Technology
The development, marketing and use of human subdermal RFID and GPS
implants raise challenging and new legal and ethical issues. As early as 1985, California
veterinarian Harris L. Stoddard was working on the development of an implantable
identification chip for use with animals.67 Implanted RFID tracking devices are used
frequently in the identification of animals. The British company Trovan, Ltd. markets
various forms of implantable transponders and readers throughout the world for animal
and human identification.68
The first known experiment regarding the use of a human tracking implant took
place at the University of Reading in England in 1998. Professor of Cybernetics Kevin
Warwick had an RFID tracking device implant placed in his arm that enabling his
movements on campus to be monitored for one week. An expressed purpose for the
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experiment was to demonstrate the inherent dangers to personal privacy connected with
implant technology.69
Dr. John D. Halamka, the Chief Information Officer for the Harvard Medical
Center, has conducted a more recent and longer experiment in the use of a voluntary
human RFID implant containing a 16-digit medical identifier. With the use of a handheld
RFID transponder, Dr. Halamka’s implanted identifier can be obtained and used to
discover his identity and his doctor through an internet site maintained by the
manufacturer. Significantly, the implant does not include any medical history or any
known disabilities and is not equipped to monitor Dr. Halamka’s location. His
willingness to participate in the experiment was an outgrowth of Dr. Halamka’s
experiences as an emergency room resident when he was unable to determine the
identification of patients. In his article, Dr. Halamka acknowledges the possibility that the
implant can lead to invasion of privacy due to the non-use of encryption technology, the
unauthorized use of transponders and hacking. In response to claims by others that human
implant chips are Orwellian in nature, Dr. Halamka concedes: “I have not investigated
these or other moral, religious, or political implications of having an implanted
identifier.”70
In general, the marketing and publicity surrounding these implant products focus
primarily on the purported convenience, security and the ability to alleviate fear. The
impact on personal privacy, the products’ reliability and the interception of data by third
parties has not received similar coverage. The American company Applied Digital
Solutions, Inc. markets an RFID VeriChip implantable for humans that can be used for
identification and security as well a GPS wristband product known as Digital Angel . In
2003, Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. announced that it had developed a human implant
that can function as a GPS personal location device.71 In 2006, Qustar Ltd. plans on
commencing the marketing to parents of two models of implantable GPS devices aimed
at responding to American parental fear of child abductions.72
Companies are aggressively promoting human implant products in the United
States and abroad utilizing standard advertising techniques. They are being marketed for
both security and recreational purposes. RFID implants are being publicized as a mere
technological extension to the body-piercing trend that permits bodily integration with
computers. A technology entrepreneur who volunteered for an implants in both hands
admitted to the New York Times “the symbolism of the tag is much more of a big deal as
a social marker.”73 A website has been established in an effort to expand this social
phenomenon of voluntary technological branding.74
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In Mexico, the Verichip has been implanted in government officials for access
to a secure government building and non-government volunteers have received implants
in response to their fear of being kidnapped.75 RFID implants are being marketed for
voluntary use by tavern patrons to avoid having to pay with cash or credit cards and for
computer users who cannot remember the passwords.76 Others, with an economic interest
in the technology, have publicly volunteered to receive implants as part of a marketing
strategy.77
The development, marketing and use of human RFID and GPS implants raise
important legal and ethical issues.78 At present, the legal ramifications regarding
implants, including the legality of government mandated human implants, remains
undeveloped.
It is improbable that a government program requiring human implants for noncriminals would be found to be lawful. Such a mandate would run afoul of Supreme
Court due process jurisprudence and precedent establishing a constitutionally protected
right to privacy against governmental intrusions into intimate personal affairs.79
Mandated government intrusions into the human body implicate substantial liberty
interests protected under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.80
In Rochin v. California,81 the Court held that the police violated the due process
rights of a drug suspect when they compelled an involuntary pumping of his stomach in
order to seize two capsules containing drugs that he had been swallowed. Justice Felix
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Frankfurter, writing for the majority, emphasized the significance of coerced
governmental intrusions into the body:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy
of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there,
the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents-this course of proceeding by
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. They are methods, to close to the rack and the screw to permit of
constitutional differentiation.82
Under Fourth Amendment, the Court treats all physical intrusions by
governmental officials into a human body as a search and seizure because it violates an
expectation of privacy recognized by our society. This reasonable expectation of privacy
against unwanted bodily intrusions is balanced against the articulated legitimate
governmental interest to determine whether the search was unreasonable.83 The
application of this balancing test is very different when “special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.”84 When the “special needs” concerns are not related to crime detection,
courts will make a context-specific inquiry balancing the competing private and public
interests.85
For example, mandatory drug and alcohol testing programs in employment and
public schools have been upheld under the Fourth Amendment based on special safety
needs that outweighed the reasonable expectation of privacy against such bodily
intrusions.86 In contrast, a state hospital policy, established with the aid of the police,
under which non-consenting pregnant patients were subjected to urine drug tests and
were subject to criminal prosecution if they tested positive for cocaine was struck down
as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.87 In 1997, the Supreme Court invalided on
Fourth Amendment grounds a state law mandating that state political candidates certify
that he or she has taken a drug test and that the result was negative. In striking down the
statute, the Supreme Court found that the State lacked any special need based on the lack
of evidence demonstrating a drug problem among elected state officials or that they
performed safety sensitive job duties.88

82

342 U.S. at 172.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S.602 (1989)
84
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackman, J., concurring in judgment).
85
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
86
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, supra; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)(upholding the use of drug testing for government employees as a condition of
promotion or transfer to certain positions directly involving drug interdiction or requiring the employee to
carry a firearm); Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug
testing for high school students participating in interscholastic sports).
87
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
88
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. at 321-322.
83

20

Based on the sustained nature of an implant’s intrusion into the body, it is
improbable that the courts, in most situations, would find that a special government
interest outweighed the liberty and privacy interests protected under the United States
Constitution.
Without new legislation banning the practice, the common law tort of assault and
battery, as well as the Thirteenth Amendment, would form the bases for challenging
privately mandated human tracking implants. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital89, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that “every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”90
When someone is subjected to unwanted non-emergency surgery, they have the right to
sue for damages for assault.91
Mandated human RFID implants that contain confidential medical information
may also violate the confidentiality provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).92 A
mandate that medical information protected under HIPAA be made accessible through an
RFID implant to anyone with an appropriate reader would violate HIPAA’s confidential
provisions. To the extent that an employer mandates implants for employees containing
confidential medical information would render the employer vulnerable to liability based
on the ADA’s confidentiality requirements with respect to medical records.93
The population most vulnerable to a potential program of mandated human
tracking implants would be criminal convicts especially those convicted of sex crimes. In
Ohio, a county official and sheriff have stated their support for the use of implants to
monitor ex-convicts.94 Various states have already enacted laws mandating lifetime
electronic monitoring for certain sex offenders. Based on the current level of public fear
connected with sex offense, it is probably only a matter of time before more politicians
call for the use of tracking implants on certain criminal convicts.
Whether the Court will deem the use of tracking implants for inmates and other
convicts to be violative of due process remains to be seen. Even when prison officials
intrude on substantial liberty interests of prisoners, the regulation will be upheld as long
as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.95
For at least a decade, electronic wrist and ankle bracelets have been required as a
condition of house arrest, probation and parole to enable officials to keep track of the
offenders in and outside the home. Individuals under house arrest, along with
probationers and parolees, are granted “conditional liberty” subject to special and unique
89
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restrictions including a significantly reduced expectation of privacy.96 Due to the
limitations connected with the radial scope of RFID technology, electronic bracelets
utilizing GPS technology are increasingly being utilized throughout the country. In 2005,
the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that a GPS device that was able to track a
probationer’s movement outside the home violated the statutory definition of a
monitoring device permissible for home detention.97
As a practical matter, most people convicted of a crime would prefer electronic
location monitoring to incarceration. This alternative to prison serves various societal
interests because it is less expensive and grants the offender a greater opportunity to
engage in rehabilitative activities.
Although electronic bracelets have been utilized successfully, the fact that they
are less intrusive than electronic implants does not preclude the possibility that human
electronic implants will be found to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
applied to criminal offenders. In a series of Fourth Amendment decisions, the Supreme
Court has been dismissive of arguments premised on the mere existence of less intrusive
means.98 Under the Fourth Amendment special needs and general balancing tests, federal
courts have sustained state laws mandating the extraction of DNA samples from the
bodies of various classes of convicted offenders to be utilized in a computerized DNA
database.99 In any challenge to possible future use of human implants on criminal
offenders, strong national evidence will have to be presented to a court demonstrating the
success of the less intrusive electronic bracelets along with evidence establishing that
implanted GPS technology is not more accurate or reliable than data stemming from a
bracelet.
III. Federal Legislative Responses to Human Tracking and Cellular Technology
In response to the development of electronic technology, Congress has enacted
legislation placing certain restrictions on the use tracking technologies by federal law
enforcement. The protection of privacy against the use of tracking technologies,
however, has not been a major congressional priority.
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(“ECPA”). The ECPA includes a specific provision regarding federal law enforcement
use of mobile tracking devices to monitor the movement of an individual or object.100
The purpose of the law was jurisdictional in nature. It did not place any expressed
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substantive limits on the use of tracking devices, require the suppression of evidence for
statutory violations or provide for any privacy protections beyond those recognized under
the Fourth Amendment.101
The ECPA does include statutory mandates requiring federal law enforcement to
apply before a federal judge for issuance of a search warrant based on probable cause or a
court order based on a lesser standard when it seeks the release of certain forms of
subscriber information from a wireless company.102 Title III of ECPA establishes
procedures relating to the use of pen registers and trap/trace devices, commonly referred
to as a caller identification system, by federal law enforcement to capture the phone
numbers of outgoing and incoming calls.103 In 1994, Congress enacted the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act prohibiting wireless providers
from disclosing “any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber” based on call-identification information acquired through the government’s
use of a pen register or trap/trace device.104
In 1999, Congress enacted the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act
that contains an express limitation on the use or disclosure by telecommunication
companies of call location information regarding mobile service customers.105 Litigation
challenging the FCC regulations with respect to the nature of consumer authorization
required for the disclosure of location information has substantially muddled the
enforceability of this location privacy provision.106 Despite this continued lack of clarity
related to consumer consent, United States District Court Magistrate Stephen William
Smith has concluded that the statute places location information into “a special class of
consumer information, which can only be used or disclosed in an emergency situation,
absent express prior consent by the customer. Based on the statute, a cell phone user may
very well have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his call location
information.” 107
Congress has been resistant to passing legislation aimed at placing limitations on
the ability of employers to impose electronic workplace tracking. In 1993, the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act, was introduced in Congress that sought to set limitations on
the use tracking technology in the workplace including mandating written notification to
employees regarding the surveillance. The bill died in committee. One year later, in 2000,
the Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act was introduced. The proposed legislation sought
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to amend the ECPA to mandate employers to provide written notice to employees
regarding employer use of tracking technology. Congress never acted upon the bill.108
IV.

State Common and Statutory Law Response To Electronic Human Tracking
A.

The Application of State Tort Law

Since the 19th Century, various state courts have recognized common law
invasion of privacy torts that may be applicable to the use of electronic tracking devices.
There are four distinct privacy torts recognized today in many states: (a) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of another’s name or likeness;
c) unreasonable publicity given to another's private life; (d) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.109 Privacy torts grant individuals the
right to bring a lawsuit for damages usually in state court against the person who invaded
the individual’s privacy.
The privacy tort with the strongest relevance to the use of location tracking
devices is the intrusion on seclusion tort.110 The Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B
defines the tort of intrusion on seclusion in the following manner:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
This privacy tort is not limited to the physical trespass into another person’s home
or other physical space. It has been found applicable to attempted eavesdropping on
private conversations with or without the use of technological devices.111
The viability of this type of lawsuit challenging the per se use of electronic
tracking devices to follow another person outside the home remains dubious.112 Comment
(c) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B states that there can not be liability for
observing or photographing another person while he or she is walking on a public street
because the person is not in seclusion.
In 2005, the Connecticut Appellate Court issued the first appellate decision
considering an intrusion upon seclusion claim based on the use of a GPS device.113 In
108
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Turner v. American Car Rental, Inc., a rental company had installed a global positioning
system in its vehicles as a means of controlling and punishing drivers for exceeding a set
speed limit. Under the company’s policy and practice, the vehicle’s GPS receiver
transmitted the speed and location of the vehicle to a monitoring company that in turn
faxed the results to the rental company. In its form lease, the company stated that each
rental vehicle contained a GPS receiver and set as a contractual condition that each time
the rented vehicle exceeded 79 miles per hour for two minutes or longer, the leaser would
be fined $150.00.114 In dismissing the invasion of privacy tort action, the Connecticut
appellate court concluded that it was unaware of any legal precedent establishing that the
installation of a GPS device in a car violates the privacy rights of the driver or that that
driver has an expectation of privacy on a public highway.115
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Knotts116that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to one’s location while driving led a
United States District Court judge to dismiss an employee’s intrusion upon seclusion
claim against his employer for monitoring him through the installation of a GPS device in
the company van that the employee used during work and during non-work hours.117
In Ohio, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a class action lawsuit brought
by cell phone users against a large cellular phone service company for intrusion upon
seclusion based on the company providing to a research firm specific information
regarding its cell phone customers including their names, telephone numbers, addresses
and social security numbers. The Ohio appellate court emphasized that in order to state a
claim for intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiffs must allege private facts and that none of the
information provided to the research company constituted private information.118
Similarly, an intrusion upon seclusion action against an employer for videotape
surveillance of an employee was dismissed because the videotaping was limited to the
employee’s public activities.119
In 2003, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an
intrusion upon seclusion lawsuit against an internet-based investigation and information
service company that had obtained employment information about the plaintiff’s daughter
114
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Amy Boyer by making a pre-textual call to Ms. Boyer. After obtaining the information,
the company provided it to a New Hampshire man named Liam Youens who had ordered
it over the internet for $109. After receiving the employment information from the
company, Youens went to Ms. Boyer’s workplace and shot her dead before he committed
suicide.120 In dismissing the mother’s intrusion upon seclusion claim in Remsburg v.
Docusearch, Inc., the New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically relied upon the public
exposure exception to the right to privacy:
A person’s employment, where he lives, and where he works are exposures
which we all must suffer. We have no reasonable expectation of privacy as to
our identity or as to where we live or work. Our commuting to and from where
we live and work is not done clandestinely and each place provides a facet of our
total identity.121
Nevertheless, based on societal concerns regarding the dangers of stalking and
identity theft in the new technological age, the New Hampshire court ruled that if
criminal misconduct against a third person is sufficiently foreseeable, an investigator has
a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care when disclosing that person's personal
information to a client.122
B.

State Statutory Limitations on Electronic Tracking Devices

Many states have enacted legislation aimed at restricting the use of electronic
devices by members of the public and the police. Other states are considering similar
limitations on the use of such devices in vehicles.123 Most of these measures are aimed at
creating new criminal prohibitions or procedures and expanding consumer protections
with respect to rental companies. Due to the speed of technological change, the pace of
legislative deliberations and the intricacy of the technology, these legislative measures
have not included responses to human implants and cellular technology. Furthermore,
state initiatives aimed at regulating location surveillance in the workplace have been
unsuccessful.124
In response to court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the warrantless
use of tracking devices by police, various states have enacted laws requiring law
enforcement officials to apply to a court for a judicial warrant before installing such
devices. Many of these statutes place specific time limits on the period of
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authorization.125 Other states have enacted laws regulating the use of tracking devices for
criminal offenders subject to house arrest, probation or parole. 126
In 1998, California Legislature enacted a criminal statute prohibiting the use of
“an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a person.” The
statute defines the phrase “electronic tracking device” as a device “attached to a vehicle
or other movable thing that reveals its location or movement.” The legislation contains
two consent exceptions: when the owner, leasor, or leasee of a vehicle has consented to
the use of the device; and lawful use by law enforcement.127 In addition, California has
enacted consumer legislation limiting the use of GPS technology by rental companies.
Under this law, rental companies are permitted to install GPS technology in their vehicles
but are prohibited from using the electronic data to impose surcharges or fines.128 Similar
consumer legislation regarding rental companies has been enacted in other states.129
Texas, in 1999, enacted a criminal law prohibiting the installation of an
“electronic or mechanical tracking device on a motor vehicle owned or leased by another
person.” The Texas statute establishes a defense against criminal prosecutions for owner
or leasee who has consented to the installation as well as law enforcement purposes. A
defense was also carved into the law for private investigators, who after obtaining written
consent from the owner or leasee, can install the device in a vehicle or a in a private
residential property. The private investigator defense permits distrustful employers,
spouses or friends to utilize private detectives and GPS technology to track a third
party.130
Montana’s statutory limitation on electronic tracking devices was not made
applicable to the tracking vehicles or humans. In 1999, the Montana legislature, acting
based on the perceived needs of that state, enacted a law that prohibits hunters from
utilizing electronic devices “to track the motion of a game animal and relay information
on the animal’s movement to the hunter.” 131
The enactment of these laws has led to at least three criminal prosecutions against
individuals who have unlawfully used an electronic device. In 2000, Robert Sullivan’s
wife commenced legal proceedings to end their marriage and she obtained a restraining
order against him. In response, Sullivan installed a GPS device in her car to keep track of
her activities. For over a month, the device was installed and removed by Sullivan to
enable him to download the information.132 Sullivan was successfully prosecuted and his
conviction affirmed under Colorado’s harassment by stalking statute that outlaws placing
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another person under surveillance in a manner that would cause serious emotional
distress.133
In Wisconsin in 2002, a man pled no contest to stalking his former girlfriend by
placing a GPS device under the hood of her car. The plea resulted from the police
obtaining the electronic records of his use of the technology.134
In Delaware, Nancy Biddle was prosecuted in 2005 for attaching a GPS tracking
device to the frame of another woman’s car for tracking purposes. Ms. Biddle was
convicted under Delaware’s invasion of privacy criminal statute that prohibits the
nonconsensual installation “in any private place” of a device for “observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events in that place.”135
After reviewing the conflicting federal and state case law on the question of whether an
individual has reasonable expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle, a Delaware
judge convicted Ms. Biddle noting that that increased use of electronic devices is eroding
person al liberty.136
V. The Use of Tracking Devices In Employment
Increasingly, throughout the United States, private and public sector employers
are utilizing RFID, GPS and cellular technology as a means of monitoring work
performance.137 In 2004, employers spent approximately $9 billion in technological
monitoring devices for the workplace.138 At least one United States employer, an Ohio
surveillance company, has announced that two of its employees have received RFID
implants for identification purposes.139 In a survey of 24, major federal agencies, the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 13 agencies had
implemented or had plans to implement RFID technology.140 Employers justify the
implementation of such technology in the name of safety, security, efficiency and
productivity.141 However, employer use of this new technology does not usually stem
from empirical data or anecdotal evidence demonstrating an increase in workplace
fatalities and injuries or a decrease in efficiency and productivity.
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As a practical matter, employers already have at their disposal many other
effective and less intrusive managerial tools to deal with safety concerns, security and
productivity: employee training; tachometers and odometers to measure speed, distance
and mileage; intercom, two-way radios and cell phones; and supervisor and co-worker
visual observations to ferret out employee misconduct. Electronic location monitoring
enables employers to learn non-work related information including personal habits, tastes
and interests of employees. In addition, this information can become vulnerable to third
party access.142
Based on the lack of empirical or anecdotal evidence, there appears to be one
central explanation for the growing use of human tracking technology in employment: an
effort by employers to expand their power and domination over their workforce. Twenty
years ago, Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen recognized that employer use of electronic
technology for employee monitoring is a modern means of implementing the
management ideas of Frederick Taylor that are aimed at increasing productivity and
maximizing employer profit.143
In order to avoid the stigma of being perceived as engaging in excessive
surveillance, some employers will rely on pretexts to justify the use of tracking
technology. Pretexts and secrecy are used to avoid a perception that the employer is
using totalitarian tools or mistreating its employees.
Prior to the purchase and implementation of workplace tracking technology, it is
rare for an employer to discuss with its employees the purpose and nature of the new
form of surveillance. Without a union representing the employees, the employer has no
legal obligation to discuss or negotiate changes in terms and conditions in employment
including the implementation of tracking technology. Nevertheless, advocates for the
expansive use of the new technology encourage employers to be open and honest with
their employers.144
An unusual public debate regarding the proposed implementation of tracking
technology in employment took place in the City of Boston in 2004. On November 8,
2004, the Boston City Council conducted a legislative hearing to consider a proposed
order to encourage the installation of GPS devices on Boston’s 720 public school buses.
Councillor John M. Tobin Jr., as chair of the Boston City Council’s Education
Committee, scheduled the public hearing to examine the use of GPS technology as a
means of keeping track of the location of students thereby enhancing their safety.145
During the hearing, representatives from the school district, the bus company and the bus
drivers union debated the need and rationale for the implementation of GPS
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technology.146 At the time, the school district utilized a two-day radio system along with
an electronic system that kept track of each bus’s mileage and the time when it left and
returned. Supervisory road audits were used to monitor bus driver work performance. The
school bus company representative present at the hearing articulated various reasons to
justify the use of a GPS system: provide back-up information in emergency situations;
keep tabs on bus arrivals and departures; monitor bus speeds; insure bus drivers’
adherence to set bus routes and provide guidance in following those routes.
In response, union officials and rank and file bus drivers refuted these alleged
purposes. The union president stated that the primary purpose for the bus company
wanting the new technology was to be able to challenge the wage of each bus driver that
is based on the specific amount of time they worked each day. He explained that the
surveillance system would not enable the company to know the reason for a bus delay or
the modification of a bus route. With respect to student safety, the primary reason given
by City Councillors for supporting the resolution, various drivers told the Councillors that
GPS technology could not provide data regarding which bus a student may be on or
identify the specific location where a student exited. They emphasized that the best
means of insuring that students get on the correct bus and off at the correct stop would be
through personal supervision by a bus monitor. Finally, the bus drivers explained that a
GPS device, like a two-way radio system, is subject to interference and mechanical
breakdown.
Although locating students was the articulated central rationale behind the Boston
GPS legislation, no one at the three hour City Council hearing mentioned using RFID
technology as a means of keeping track of students like other school districts.147 A
detached look at the articulated municipal need and the available technology should have
led Boston officials to discuss the possible use of smart cards and RFID badges for
students. The failure to consider the use of an RFID system for students suggests that
student safety was the pretext for the proposed location scrutiny of Boston bus drivers.
Alternatively, the lack of a discussion regarding the use of the alternative technology may
be reflective of an uninformed and reactive approach to incorporating new technology in
the workplace.
Another example of the use of a pretext to justify the installation of tracking
technology was presented during a 2005 disciplinary arbitration when a small marketing
company offered GPS data to justify an employee’s termination.148 In December 2003,
the company secretly installed GPS devices in all of its company’s vehicles. During the
arbitration, the company contended that the reason for installing the tracking technology
146
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was to enable supervisors to know where to contact employees by telephone. The
company claimed that the secret tracking technology would increase productivity over
the prior practice of using cell phones or calling work locations.149 The illogic of the
company’s rationale is self-evident. The secrecy connected with the installation showed
that the GPS device was never intended to be a means of communication between
supervisors and employees. Even with the availability of the device, supervisors still had
to call employees on their cell phones or at the worksites.
A far more colorable explanation for the company’s decision to begin using the
tracking technology was an incident six months earlier when the company’s owner
discovered that a twenty-year employee, who was the subject of the arbitration, was
missing at a worksite. Subsequent GPS data along with visual verification demonstrated
to the company that the same employee was at home when he was supposed to be
working in the field.
The breadth and secrecy of the company’s implementation of tracking technology
backfired. Although the arbitrator concluded that the employee was guilty of serious
misconduct, the arbitrator vacated the termination and imposed a sixty-day suspension
based on the company’s failure to disclose to its workforce the installation and purpose of
the GPS system.150
A much more targeted approach to the use of GPS technology was utilized by a
Missouri bottling company seeking to investigate cash shortages from vending machines
in a particular service area.151 Rather than over reacting by installing GPS devices in all
company vehicles, the employer placed monitoring devices only in vehicles used by
employees with access to the specific machines with reported shortfalls. After the
employee was cleared of wrongdoing, he received notification that during the
investigation he had been tracked with GPS technology.152
The use of pretext and secrecy regarding the use of tracking technology is aimed
at avoiding employee opposition. Based on the power of the tracking devices, it is not
surprising that it has resulted in employee protests and demonstrations against what is
perceived to be a substantial intrusion into employee privacy. In Massachusetts, both
snowplow operators and bus drivers have engaged in collective action at legislative
hearings to challenge the use of human tracking.153 Employees are not the only people
protesting against the implementation of tracking devices. Parent protests in a school
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district in Sutter County, California, resulted in the district withdrawing its plan to
implement RFID monitoring for its students.154
In addition to overt protests, human tracking can lead directly to demoralization,
hostility and lower productivity among the most dedicated and motivated of
employees.155 Under real-time scrutiny, employees feel dehumanized and fear being
disciplined based on inaccurate electronic data or employers misconstruing the data.156
For example, after an ABC television station affiliate installed GPS tracking devices on
the station’s mobile trucks, an unnamed on-air reporter was quoted by New York
Magazine as stating: “Let’s just say people are pretty pissed off…We were never really
consulted, and the whole Big Brother aspect has us uncomfortable.”157 The sense of anger
and fear articulated by this television reporter underscores the demoralizing impact
caused by electronic tracking in the workplace.
At present, employees have few legal rights against the implementation or use of
tracking technology by their employers while performing work duties.158 The scope of
recognized employee freedoms while at work in the United States is quite limited. As the
United States Supreme Court has observed “[o]rdinarily, an employee consents to
significant restrictions in his freedom of movement where necessary for his employment,
and few are free to come and go as they please during working hours.”159
The Oregon Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in State v. Meredith160 is indicative of
the narrow judicial treatment of location privacy for employees. Sixteen years before, the
same court had broadly interpreted the Oregon Constitution to prohibit the warrantless
use by the police of a tracking transmitter attached to a car.161 In contrast, in State v.
Meredith, the same court held that the use of the same type of electronic tracking device
placed on the employer’s vehicle used by an employee to perform her job duties in a
national forest did not require a warrant. In reaching its decision, the court found that the
employee “did not have a protected privacy interest in keeping her location and workrelated activities concealed from the type of observation by her employer that the
transmitter revealed.”162
In O’Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court ruled that public employees have
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in the workplace.
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The Fourth Amendment is implicated only when workplace realities establish that the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy through the use of doors, locks and
personal passwords. The openness of an office to the public and other employees may
result in an expectation of privacy being deemed unreasonable.163
In 2001, a federal appellate court ruled that a state employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content contained in his workplace computer.164 In
concluding that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
office computer, the appellate court noted that that the employee occupied a private office
and maintained exclusive use of the computer, desk and filing cabinet. Even with the
establishment of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the appeals court found that the
search of the employee’s computer was reasonable because it was based on the
employer’s reasonable suspicion that it would uncover evidence of employee
misconduct.165
The O’Connor v. Ortega legal standards will result in interesting future legal
challenges to the use of human tracking devices in public employment. For example, the
Supreme Court’s Karo decision may form the basis for a successful challenge to a public
employer utilizing certain RFID and other internal tracking technology that allows for
location surveillance in private areas, such as employee bathrooms and break rooms,
where employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Another important
unresolved issue is whether the application of Knotts, Karo and O’Connor analyses will
lead to Fourth Amendment or state constitutional limitations on government employers
using GPS technology in laptops, cell phones and other devices that would permit
monitoring of employee location and movement while in the home.
In the private sector, the primary national law granting employees certain limited
statutory workplace freedom, especially the right to organize, is the National Labor
Relations Act.166 Under that law, employers are prohibited from engaging in surveillance
of protected concerted conduct and are obligated to negotiate mandatory subjects of
bargaining with a certified or recognized union regarding certain forms of employee
surveillance.167
The information provided by human tracking devices can be a very powerful tool
in an employer’s effort to defeat a union organizing campaign. By having electronic
access to the location of employees at all times, the employer can determine which
employees have been meeting together during lunch hours and break time and/or which
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employees have visited the union’s office.168 As a practical matter, however, it may be
very difficult for a union or employee to establish that an employer’s alleged
discriminatory conduct toward an employee was based on electronic tracking.
In September 2005, a New York federal judge rejected a union’s effort to vacate
an arbitrator’s decision that had found that the employer had a right, under the union
contract, to install GPS technology in company owned vehicles. The contract contained
language granting the employer the right to continually upgrade technology it uses and
specified certain electronic devices being utilized by employees. In 2002, the company
decided to install the GPS technology in company vehicles driven by employees.
Employees reacted strongly to the installation of the GPS devices and their union
challenged the employer’s action through the contractual grievance procedure. The
arbitrator concluded that the contract language granted the employer the right to upgrade
the technology it utilized. In rejecting the union’s effort to set aside the arbitrator’s
decision, the federal court noted that the contract granted the employer expansive
authority to update the technology it utilizes.169
The National Labor Relation Board’s General Counsel has issued an advice
memorandum on the question of whether a trucking company was legally obligated to
negotiate with the Teamsters’ union prior to installing GPS technology in company
vehicles.170 The memorandum concluded that the company did not have to negotiate with
the union because it constituted a replacement of a prior communications system. Before
the installation of the electronic system, the truck dispatcher utilized a two-way radio to
communicate with drivers. Throughout the day, at specific set times, the drivers were
required to use the radio to communicate with the dispatcher. In addition, log sheets had
to be submitted by drivers at the end of their shift. Although the new GPS technology
provided the employer with substantially greater surveillance power and information than
the prior two-way radio, including the ability to monitor break times, the General
Counsel reached the conclusion that the GPS technology was equivalent to the radio
system and did not constitute a significant change in employment.
The six-year negotiated contract between the United Parcel Service and the
Teamsters contains a clause limiting the ability of the employer to discipline employees
based on data collected through the GPS device carried by its employees. The contract
states:
“No employee shall be disciplined for exceeding personnel time based on
data received from the DIAD/IVIS or other information technology.”171
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Negotiated contractual provisions depriving employers of the ability to utilize
location tracking information in discipline fits into what Jeffrey Rosen has labeled the
“control-use model” of regulating new forms of technology surveillance.172 In light of the
employer’s power over its employees during work time, a contractual provision limiting
the use of human tracking in disciplinary cases is a regulatory victory for employees. It
also undercuts a primary articulated purpose for using such technology, namely
discovering and disciplining employees for misconduct. Nevertheless, this type of
negotiated language has inherent weaknesses. It accepts employer electronic tracking
during an employee’s personnel time and does not prohibit electronic surveillance after
hours. The provision does not address the employer’s use of inaccurate information
stemming from improper settings or malfunction and does not set any boundaries relating
to the employer obtaining personal information about the employees’ non-work
activities.173
VI.

Potential Legal Solutions

Prior to the establishment of potential legal solutions to human tracking
technology, our society needs to conduct a measured and meaningful debate to reach a
national or local consensus regarding the acceptable contours of privacy in the new
technological age. Such discussions should be aimed at drawing a proper balance
between liberty and security and individual rights and property rights. A reexamination of
the reasonable expectation test should be explored during such a dialogue along with the
issue of whether there is a societal consensus that exterior exposure should constitute the
end of protected privacy.
Reliance on public fears perpetuated by the mass media and marketing schemes
aimed at responding to such fears is not a formula for the development of reasoned public
policy. Similarly, horrific acts perpetuated by the use of tracking devices should not be
the only catalyst for modification of public policy regarding new technologies.
Gary T. Marx’s suggestion that the use of new powerful surveillance tools may
decrease or be modified if managers and corporate executives were equally subject to
such surveillance remains untested.174 Jeffrey Rosen has rejected the notion that
ubiquitous technological transparency constitutes an adequate or appropriate means of
balancing liberty with security.175 Nevertheless, those advocating for the implementation
of human tracking technology on others do not necessarily want to be subject to the same
level of scrutiny. During the rare public debate in the Boston City Council regarding GPS
technology in employment, the chief shop steward for the union representing the school
bus drivers asked Councillor Tobin how he would react if his manager or boss monitored
his every move through GPS surveillance. Rather than providing a reflective answer
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regarding his own subjective sense of personal autonomy, the Councillor responded
angrily asserting that his constituents would be able to vote for or against him in the next
election.
The question of location transparency for public officials remains unexplored. In
developing and considering remedial legislation, it may be beneficial for a public official
to agree to subject him or herself to location tracking for a day or week. A wellpublicized experiment involving a public figure wearing a GPS device would lead to a
greater understanding regarding the power of the technology as well as potential legal
changes needed to protect individual privacy. There is precedent for such an experiment.
Companies are promoting tracking implants through publicity surrounding individuals
who have consented to human implant. Public exposure to the results of technological
tracking would enhance the debate regarding the use of the technology.
Based on the slow congressional response to the development of new
technologies and the current political climate, it is unlikely that federal remedial
legislation limiting human tracking technology will be enacted in the near future. It is
possible that a well-publicized event caused by the abuse or misuse of tracking
technology may result in rapid and reactive federal legislation. An alternative to emotive
legislative responses to important privacy issues would be the establishment of a federal
privacy commissioner or privacy commission, similar to governmental offices established
in Canada and Australia, to study and analyze new technologies and provide Congress
with suggested remedies. However, it is far more probable that a majority in the current
Congress would want to defer to the marketplace for potential corrective action aimed at
avoiding privacy intrusions. Such deferral would be based on the erroneous assumption
that there is more profit to be made in protecting privacy than in collecting, using and
distributing location information.
Reliance on the federal judiciary to find constitutional protections against human
tracking would be similarly misplaced. Based on the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, along with precedents such as Knotts, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will find
that the use of newer and more powerful technologies to track public location and
movement is subject to the Fourth Amendment. To the extent that new tracking
technologies involve monitoring within the home, Karo and Kyllo suggest that Fourth
Amendment standards would be applicable. However, law enforcement and public
employers deserve more than post-hoc federal guidance relating to the constitutional
dangers connected with the use of portable tracking devices in cell phones and laptops
that can lead to unlawful location monitoring within a home. The computerized nature of
GPS and cellular technology may result in the transition from constitutional public
monitoring to unconstitutional surveillance within a home without real-time human
supervision.
Since the development of human tracking devices, state legislatures and courts
have been far more responsive to the privacy implications of such technology. State
legislative initiatives have been aimed at criminalizing certain use of tracking technology,
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establishing judicial oversight over the police use of tracking devices and extending
consumer protections against the use of such technology in rented vehicles.
Based on the speed of technological change, states should consider legislative
commissions or committees with the authority to study technological developments and
to provide guidance regarding potential legislative responses to a particular technology.
Such guidance is needed to determine whether current state laws restricting the use of
electronic tracking devices should be amended to regulate human implants as well as
tracking devices attached to personal objects other than vehicles. States also need to
reexamine their common law or statutory privacy causes of action to determine whether
and to what extent lawsuits for damages and injunctive relief should be permitted for
unwanted electronic location surveillance in public or in the home. In addition,
consideration needs to be given to amending current state law to include sanctions for the
sale of location information to third parties. Finally, another means of checking the
potential abuse of tracking technology would be subjecting tracking devices to state
licensing regulation.
The need for careful legislative deliberation is particularly urgent in the area of
human implants where the adverse social consequences of such devises have not been
examined. The use of human implants is ripe for abuse and constitutes the most likely
technological means for imposing geoslavery. State regulatory schemes already exist
regarding what are arguably more benign intrusions into the human body such as
tattooing and body piercing. A prohibition or regulation regarding human implants should
to be carefully examined to properly weigh the varying interests associated with the
technology. In determining whether to ban human implants an examination should take
place regarding whether the availability of bracelets, cards and badges with encoded
information meet the same identification needs as implants. In addition, the substantive
distinction between information obtainable from identification-based RFID implants and
location-based GPS implants needs to be explored in developing state public policy in
this area. Finally, any state regulatory scheme permitting the use of human implants
should require informed consent with respect to the nature of the implant, the risk of
privacy intrusions associated with the implant and the means of removing the implant.
In the area of employment, state legislative initiatives may include a complete ban
on human implants, a mandate for informed employee consent prior to the
implementation of human tracking, written notice to employees regarding the
surveillance, limitations on the daily period when surveillance would be permissible,
specific legal sanctions for employers who utilize the technology for unlawful
discriminatory purposes or to intrude on personal privacy and/or a prohibition against
employers sharing the electronic data with third parties. The need for state legislative
action is particularly important based on the growing portability of tracking devices that
enables an employer to monitor an employee while working or not working and within
the employee’s own dwelling. Such initiatives should be considered after careful
legislative examination of the technology and a determination regarding the scope of
protected employee personal privacy during and after working hours.
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To the extent that fear justifies imposing electronic tracking on children and
infirm elderly parents, a state requirement for judicial intervention or licensing may be an
appropriate response. Courts already have been granted the power and jurisdiction to
deal with children in need of supervision and mentally infirm individuals needing
guardians. Placing a judicial or regulatory check on electronic tracking of children and
the ill may provide a balanced means of permitting a technological response to rational or
irrational fears while protecting personal privacy.
In the absence or as an alternative to remedial legislation, some have advocated
for “self-regulation” through industry-wide standards to protect against inappropriate
intrusions into individual privacy. For example, in the United Kingdom, an Industry
Code of Practice was established in 2004 for location service providers utilizing cellular
technology. Although self-regulatory industry standards have some benefits, they lack
necessary enforcement tools. Nevertheless, experiences connected with the development,
implementation and application of industry standards may assist in the formulation of
remedial legislation. Finally, another non-governmental means of protecting privacy
against human tracking would modifications to the actual technology that would include
an ability to turn the tracking device off and/or a signal, image or sound indicating that a
tracking device.
In conclusion, the explosive growth of human tracking technology in the past two
decades calls for a deliberative reexamination of our society’s concepts of individual
autonomy and the scope of protected privacy. The best means of reaching a societal
consensus is through sober examination, deliberations and debate with respect to the
nature of new and developing technologies and the impact it has on our concepts of
privacy. Through such a dialogue, an appropriate legal framework can be established to
insure a reasonable balance between conflicting interests associated with the technology.
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